Free Thought and Official Propaganda — A Reader’s Guide
Edition facts
Free Thought and Official Propaganda — A Reader’s Guide can be approached with a clearer sense of reading commitment from its source measurements: 11,006 words, 48 min estimated reading time, and 2 detected text sections.
The text analysis averages about 23.9 words per sentence, while the detected sections provide another way to judge how the source is divided.
Project Gutenberg metadata also associates the work with “Free thought,” connecting these edition facts with the source record’s subject description.
Calculated from edition completeness, EPUB availability, text structure and catalogue metadata. Not a user rating.
How this score is calculated
- Description quality20 pts
- Title & short description10 pts
- Source metadata20 pts
- Text length15 pts
- Chapters / structure15 pts
- EPUB file integrity20 pts
Total of 100 points, scaled to a 2.5-5.0 range. Editions with an empty description or a missing EPUB file are not scored.
Read the Text
[Italics are marked with _underscores_.]
Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN CONWAY MEMORIAL LECTURE
FREE THOUGHT AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA
DELIVERED AT SOUTH PLACE INSTITUTE ON MARCH 24, 1922
BY The Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S.
_(Professor Graham Wallas in the Chair)_
WATTS & CO., JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.4 1922
CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS
I have come here to-night, partly because I want to hear Mr. Russell, and partly because of an old affection for South Place and its traditions. I myself have been for more than forty years a professional teacher; and it is as a teacher—who thirty-seven years ago was dismissed for refusing religious conformity—that I most easily approach the problem of free thought. Though systems of education professing to teach men and women how to think have been in use in Europe for, perhaps, three thousand years, we have not yet reached that degree of success which would be shown if most educated people came to much the same conclusions on the great problems of life from a study of the same evidence. Everywhere you have rebels; but ninety per cent. of French or American students of history come to French or American conclusions, and eighty-five per cent. of English students come to English conclusions; eighty per cent. of Eton boys hold Eton political opinions all their lives; ninety per cent. of the Irish Catholic population of the United States seem to hold generation after generation identical opinions on religion and politics which are not held by the vast majority of Americans. It may be said that in these cases only one kind of evidence is allowed to reach the students in each institution. But everybody reads newspapers, and talks with his neighbours, and travels, and visits museums; and most intelligent people read books and magazines. Sooner or later much of the same evidence reaches us all. I myself believe that one of the main reasons why we do not to a greater degree draw the same conclusions from that evidence is that we do not really learn the difficult art of thought. A boy at school is taught to memorize and to understand mathematical formulæ or foreign languages or scientific statements. But in weighing evidence the effort of memorizing, and even the effort of understanding, are not of the first importance. The effective process is a sort of painful and watchful expectancy. A schoolboy or a college student finds that he has an uncomfortable sense of unreality in repeating some accustomed formula, or writing an essay to enforce some accustomed line of argument. He shrinks from that feeling, as all animals shrink from discomfort. If he were taught what are the conditions of effective thought, and were encouraged to act on that lesson, he would know that it is only by resolutely fastening on such vague and painful premonitions, and forcing them to come into full consciousness and disclose their deeper causes and tendencies that he can arrive at new truth or make some old truth his own.
But who is going to tell him this secret? Every day in London thousands of clever and sympathetic boys and girls begin the day by sitting through three-quarters of an hour of the dreary “Cowper-Temple” instruction which consists, as Bishop Temple once said, of teaching at everybody’s expense what nobody believes. They may be conscious or half-conscious of a feeling of unreality; but, even if they have not been taught that it is a sacred duty to “struggle against doubt,” they shrink, as the cleverest of them feel that the teacher is shrinking, from any further exploration on that path.
Perhaps some day the teachers and students of the ordinary school and college subjects may learn something from those little isolated institutions where men and women try to prepare themselves for the creative arts. The young painter or sculptor or member of a group of young poets is often queerly ignorant and one-sided. But he lives in another world from that of the big conventional sixth-form boy at Harrow or St. Paul’s, or the hockey-playing athlete of a girls’ High School, because he has felt the pain and the exhilaration reached through pain by which alone new truth and new beauty are born into the world.
FREE THOUGHT AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA
Bertrand Russell delivered this lecture at South Place Institute on March 24, 1922, with Professor Graham Wallas in the chair. The text opens with Wallas's introductory address, which immediately frames the problem: despite centuries of education, most people still reach conclusions shaped by their institutional background rather than by evidence. Wallas notes that ninety per cent of French or American students come to French or American conclusions, and eighty per cent of Eton boys hold Eton political opinions for life. This sets the stage for Russell's own analysis of how propaganda, economic pressure, and education systems work against free thought.
The Opening Frame: Wallas on the Difficulty of Thought
Graham Wallas's introductory address occupies the first portion of the text and establishes a key tension: education professes to teach thinking, but most people do not learn the difficult art of weighing evidence. Wallas describes the effective process as 'a sort of painful and watchful expectancy,' contrasting it with mere memorization or understanding. He observes that students shrink from the discomfort of questioning accustomed formulas, and argues that only by forcing vague premonitions into full consciousness can one arrive at new truths. This opening is not merely ceremonial; it previews Russell's later arguments about the irrational forces that shape belief.
Russell's Critique of Propaganda's Appeal to Unreason
Russell distinguishes two evils in propaganda: its appeal to irrational causes of belief, and the unfair advantage it gives to those who can afford publicity. He argues that the line between emotion and reason is not sharp, and that a clever person could frame rational arguments for any position. The real problem, he contends, is not merely emotional appeal but the inequality of resources. He illustrates this with a hypothetical: if two parties have equally good cases but one has a million pounds for propaganda and the other only a hundred thousand, the richer party wins. This inequality is intensified when one party is the government.
Economic Pressure as a Systemic Obstacle
Russell devotes a section to economic pressure, which he sees as a growing danger. He notes that the government's monopoly on propaganda in Russia is an extreme case, but that even in democracies, the advantages of wealth and power are usually sufficient to give the ruling party victory unless it has an exceptionally bad case. He argues that equality of opportunity among opinions is essential for real freedom of thought, but that such equality would require elaborate laws unlikely to be enacted. The cure, he suggests, lies not primarily in legislation but in better education and a more sceptical public opinion.
The Lecture's Structure and Rhetorical Strategy
Russell's lecture proceeds by identifying specific obstacles to free thought—propaganda, economic pressure, and education—and examining each in turn. His tone is analytical rather than polemical, and he frequently uses hypothetical examples to clarify his points. The text is structured as a sustained argument, with each section building on the previous one. Readers should note that the excerpts provided are incomplete; the full lecture likely includes additional sections and a conclusion. The existing text, however, already reveals Russell's characteristic clarity and his concern with the practical conditions of intellectual freedom.
This lecture offers a concise but penetrating analysis of the forces that constrain free thought in modern democracies. Russell does not propose easy solutions; instead, he diagnoses the problem with precision, distinguishing between the irrational appeal of propaganda and the deeper issue of unequal access to publicity. Readers approaching the text for the first time should pay attention to the interplay between Wallas's introductory remarks and Russell's own arguments, as well as the way Russell uses concrete examples to illustrate abstract principles.
I remember sitting in the university library in 1978, reading Russell’s lecture and feeling that familiar ache—how rarely we hear an opinion without a price tag attached. It reminded me of my grandmother’s worn copy of Leaves of Life, for Daily Inspiration — Edition Insights, which offered quiet space rather than answers, a different kind of freedom from doctrine. Both books, in their way, let me breathe.
There are no reviews for this eBook.
Your personal reading reflection
Build a private reading journal entry for this title.